THE BUSH DOCTRINE: CHINESE PERSPECTIVES AND RESPONSES

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THE BUSH DOCTRINE: CHINESE PERSPECTIVES AND RESPONSES Jing-dong Yuan The Bush Doctrine has important implications for China. It challenges principles that Beijing holds dear with respect to
state sovereignty, multipolarity, and the role of international
organizations. Continued American primacy in international
affairs marginalizes China’s importance. In addition, key ele-
ments of the Bush Doctrine such as preemption, missile
defenses, and a growing U.S. military presence as a result of
the war against terrorism directly affect Chinese national secu-
rity interests. However, while Beijing has a very negative view
of the Bush Doctrine, its responses have been more measured
and pragmatic. China recognizes its own limitation and the
need to avoid direct confrontation with the United States. Its
leaders also believe that the Bush Doctrine will have limited
application to only a few exceptional cases simply because
unilateralism cannot be sustained long in the face of domestic
and international opposition. Instead, Beijing seized the
opportunity provided by 9-11 and the changing focus of U.S.
security policy to expand areas of common interest while min-
imizing the impact of differences. How the Bush Doctrine will
affect China’s interests in the future will depend on how well
the two manage their increasingly complex relationship. Key words: Bush Doctrine, Sino-U.S. relations, post-cold war
security strategy, Taiwan Straits issue, state sov-
ereignty, North Korean nuclear crisis ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2003, pp. 111-145. connections with terrorists. For the time being at least, the extent to
which the United States can fully exercise its unilateral power is
somewhat offset by Washington’s need for continued international
support and major-power cooperation in dealing with internation-
al terrorist threats. China has therefore adopted the more pragmat-
ic approach of not directly confronting U.S. hegemonism. Instead,
Beijing has sought to promote a stable Sino-U.S. relationship by
expanding areas of common interest and minimizing the negative
impact of policy differences. The Bush Doctrine: Charting a New Course of Preemption The United States emerged from the end of the cold war as the sole superpower with historically unprecedented power. The
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration
of the Soviet Union removed major contenders to American pri-
macy. The U.S. victory in the first Gulf War of 1991 further dis-
played the overwhelming nature of its military prowess and
established its unchallenged unipolar position. The focal points
of U.S. national security strategy have become the prevention of
rising powers from challenging U.S. security interests, the world-
wide promotion of the market economy and democratization,
and a commitment to deal with emerging threats such as the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although the end of the cold war removed major security threats to the United States, new security issues were emerging
at the same time. These included regional instability, the grow-
ing risk of nuclear proliferation, and the pursuit of WMD capa-
bility by a number of states. The Clinton administration sought
to consolidate U.S. power by adjusting military alliances (e.g.,
NATO expansion and new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines),
strengthening and consolidating existing international norms
and systems dealing with WMD proliferation, and supporting
regionally-based multilateral security arrangements. The Bush administration began its term with a different approach to foreign policy. During the 2000 presidential cam-
paign, Bush’s foreign policy advisers advocated the use of Ameri-
can power to advance national interests, build and strengthen
alliances, and deal firmly with potential U.S. foes. 1 They deplored The Bush Doctrine 113 Introduction The Bush Doctrine has drawn heated debate and criticism at home and from abroad. Widely perceived as departing from the
traditional U.S. defense posture of deterrence and retaliation,
the new emphasis on preemption raises a series of questions.
One is the legality of attacking another sovereign state when the
imminence of threats is not clear. Another is its corrosive effect
on international norms and institutions. Yet a third is the prece-
dent the U.S. application of preemption sets for other states and
regions where the temptation to resort to the use of force to
resolve international conflict could arise. While the promulga-
tion of the Bush Doctrine itself can be associated with a series of
official documents and statements, some of its key elements,
such as the pursuit of U.S. security interests through unilateral
means, had already manifested themselves. The September-11
terrorist attacks against the United States only completed this
transition. The Bush Doctrine has important implications for China’s security interests. Chinese analysts agree that post-cold war U.S.
national security strategy has remained by and large unchanged.
This assessment includes the continuation of U.S. predominance
well into the future, the prevention of the rise of regional powers
that could challenge U.S. interests, and the promotion of market
economies and democratization. But key elements of the Bush
Doctrine—such as preemption, missile defense, and growing
U.S. military presence as a result of the war against terrorism—
directly affect Chinese national security interests. U.S. unilateral-
ism also challenges the principles that Beijing holds dear: state
sovereignty, multipolarity, and the role of international organiza-
tions. Continued American primacy and dominance in interna-
tional affairs marginalizes China’s importance. The next section briefly discusses the key elements of the Bush Doctrine and the debates between its critics and proponents. This
is followed by Chinese analyses that also touch on the broader U.S.
post-cold war national security strategy. The article then assesses
the implications of the Bush Doctrine for Chinese security interests
and Beijing’s options. I argue that while Beijing harbors strong
negative views of the doctrine, it recognizes that its primary tar-
gets remain terrorist groups and rogue states deemed to have close 112 Jing-dong Yuan The argument for a new set of strategies was clearly dis- played during a graduation speech President Bush gave at West
Point in June 2002: The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of
radicalism and technology. . . . [T]he promise of massive retalia-
tion against nations means nothing against shadowy terrorist net-
works with no nation or citizens to defend. Homeland defense and missile defense are part of stronger securi-
ty, and they’re essential priorities for America. Yet the war on ter-
ror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to
the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before
they emerge. [O]ur security will require all Americans to be forward-looking
and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to
defend our liberty and to defend our lives. 5 In September 2002, the Bush administration released the National Security Strategy of the United States. A comprehensive
document laying out America’s foreign and security policy in
the wake of the September 11 attacks, it vows to prevent the
emergence of any future competitor(s), commits the United
States to use its military, political, and economic resources to
encourage open societies and democracy, and reorients U.S. mil-
itary strategy toward preemptive actions. Bush warned that
“history will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger
but failed to act.” 6 The new security vision is shaped by the recognition of the emerging threats: a combination of “radical-
ism and technology,” and a danger of terrorist groups armed
with WMD and rogue states willing to assist terrorist groups.
“To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” 7 In addition, the Bush administration has moved beyond—if not completely discarded—traditional arms control and nonpro- The Bush Doctrine 115 5. The White House, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point,” June 1, 2002; emphasis added. 6. President George W. Bush’s preface to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (hereafter NSS), September 2002. 7. Ibid., pp. 14, 15. the Clinton administration’s foreign policy as indecisive and over-
ly concerned with multilateralism without sufficient focus on bot-
tom-line results. The Bush administration has reversed foreign-
policy direction on a series of foreign-policy issues ranging from
dialogue with North Korea to commitments to major internation-
al arms control treaties. 2 Even before the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administra- tion’s approaches to foreign policy had shown signs of unilater-
alism. The administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol on climate
change and the protocol to the Biological and Toxic Weapons
Convention, had gone ahead with missile defense plans, and
had withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 3 The 9-11 attacks further reinforced the notion that traditional
approaches to handling security could no longer be relied upon
to deal with emerging new threats. In his 2002 State of the Union
address, Bush described North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as consti-
tuting the “axis of evil”—states that repress their own people
and arm themselves to threaten world peace and U.S. interests—
and asserted that “the United States of America will not permit
the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the
world’s most destructive weapons.” 4 While the philosophical underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine—the neoconservative ide-
ologies of using unrivalled U.S. power to promote its values
around the world—were already in place, it was made public
after September 11 in a series of presidential speeches and White
House documents. 114 Jing-dong Yuan 1. Robert B. Zoellick, “A Republican Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, No. 1 (January-February, 2000), pp. 63-78. 2. These views are fully explored in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and
Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000). For a general
assessment of the Bush administration foreign policy at midterm, see Ivo
H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution
in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003);
“Bush at Midterm,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, No. 5 (September-October,
2003); “Grading the President,” Foreign Policy, No. 137 (July-August,
2003), pp. 28-41. 3. Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound.
4. “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002, online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-
11.html. massive retaliation, proves less inhibiting to terrorist groups that
are stateless and have no assets to protect, and to rogue states
seeking weapons of mass destruction whose rationality is hard to
determine. To protect American interests calls for the ability and
determination to use force preemptively if necessary. Critics of the Bush Doctrine point out that it could under- mine the fabric of the international system and in the end harm
U.S. interests. While preemption has always been an element of
U.S. national security policy, the context within which it has been
announced and reinforced in the aftermath of 9-11 makes it
appear to be a more prominent feature of U.S. policy than previ-
ously. The reference to the “axis of evil”; the emphasis on the
necessity of “regime change”; “either-or” choice; and the actual
use of force all send a strong signal. This rather sweeping change
has led to serious concerns and incurred strong objections within
the United States. These objections relate to the doctrine’s open-
ended nature, the danger of imitation by others, and the tram-
pling of international laws and norms. 11 Other analysts doubt whether the United States could carry out its strategy of preemption due to institutional, moral and
practical reasons. James Wirtz and James Russell suggest that
“the administration’s new doctrine is largely designed for
domestic consumption and is unlikely to be fully implemented
because of various normative and practical constraints created by
international institutions and politics.” 12 The fact of the matter is, “while acting unilaterally might sound good in principle, the
political and logistical difficulties of applying force halfway
around the world are powerful obstacles to unilateral action.” 13 However, while the debates on the Bush Doctrine continue, the
perceived negative impact on the international system and
indeed its very application in the form of Operation Iraqi Free- The Bush Doctrine 117 11. For a strong criticism of the Bush administration foreign policy, see Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of
Good Intentions (New York: Basic Books, 2003). 12. James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell, “U.S. Policy on Preventive War and Preemption,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 2003),
p. 113. See also Walter Slocomb, “Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy,”
Survival, vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring, 2003), pp. 117-30. 13. Wirtz and Russell, “U.S. Policy on Preventive War and Preemption,” p. 118. liferation approaches, and now favors (and perhaps already has
adopted) what is called a “counter-proliferation” strategy. The
Pentagon defines the new strategy as employing the “full range
of military preparations and activities to reduce, and protect
against, the threat posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons and their associated delivery systems.” The strategy is
spelled out in the December 2002 White House National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and envisions active
homeland defense, including: the development and deployment
of ballistic missile defense systems to protect American territo-
ries, U.S. troops overseas, and its friends and allies; proactive
offensive measures such as preemptive and preventive strikes;
and strengthened nonproliferation efforts at home and abroad. 8 Proponents of the Bush Doctrine argue that the United States should take advantage of the unique opportunity to use
its primacy to build a balance of power favoring freedom. Fur-
thermore, given the nature of the threats to its security interests,
the U.S. should not hesitate and must be willing to exercise its
military power to defend itself and further advance its primacy. 9 However, proponents of the doctrine also suggest that while it is
true that preemption has been elevated to a more prominent
place in U.S. security policy, the administration is not discarding
traditional approaches. Administration officials suggest that
preemption will be used “sparingly” and note that “preempting
for regime change ought to be a very rare occurrence.” 10 The rationale of the Bush Doctrine lies in the fact that America lives today in a much changed security environment. During the
cold war, while both the Soviet Union and the United States pos-
sessed huge nuclear arsenals that could destroy the world many
times over, the specter of MAD (mutual assured destruction) also
induced maximum restraint in Moscow and Washington. How-
ever, that same defense posture, relying upon deterrence and 116 Jing-dong Yuan 8. Jason D. Ellis, “The Best Defense,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring, 2003), pp. 115-33. 9. Thomas Donnelly, “The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine,” National Security Outlook, American Enterprise Institute, January 31, 2003, online
at www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15845/pub_detail.asp. 10. “Anticipatory Defense in the War on Terror: Interview with Condoleezza Rice,” New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 19, No. 4 (Fall, 2002), online at
www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_fall/rice.html. Chinese analysts also relate the Bush Doctrine to the neo- conservative agenda of building the “new empire.” They are
well aware of the role of new conservatives in the current Bush
administration. 16 The core of the group, as represented by the Project for a New American Century and the American Enter-
prise Institute, are people who have long advocated a resolute
approach to foreign policy, the United States’ moral responsibil-
ity for promoting and spreading democracy, and the need for
preemptive action against sources of threats to U.S. security.
They are both concerned with terrorism and the rise of China. 17 In effect, the neoconservatives are suggesting that the col- lapse of the Soviet Union and U.S. unipolarity provided the gen-
eral environment for the “new empire” concept. The post-cold
war security environment has changed dramatically and tradi-
tional approaches are inadequate in handling current challenges
and threats. The United States should take advantage of its
unprecedented position in the world to protect its interests and
sustain unipolarity, even applying the unilateral and preemptive
use of force to root out future threats. The rationales behind such
a policy are straightforward: first, deterrence does not work
against terrorist groups; second, since terrorist groups do not
operate within the bounds of sovereign nations, the concept of
sovereignty no longer applies in dealing with them; third, the
United States cannot wait for terrorist groups to attack first. 18 The Bush Doctrine also reflects what Chinese analysts con- sider to be the strategy of “offensive realism.” This in turn is
linked to the post-cold war U.S. global military redeployment to
consolidate its continued military superiority through a revolu- The Bush Doctrine 119 Strategy”), Liaowang (Outlook Weekly), March 24, 2003, pp. 12-17. 16 Ren Xiao and Shen Dingli, eds., Baoshou zhuyi linian yu meiguo de waijiao zhengce (Conservatism and U.S. Foreign Policy) (Shanghai: Sanlian shu-
dian, 2003). 17. Zhang Jianjing, “Xinbaoshou zhuyi chongji zhongmei guanxi” (The Impact of Neo-Conservatism on Sino-US Relations), Guangzhou Nanfeng
Chuang, August 1, 2003, pp. 12-15, FBIS-CPP20030812000028. 18. Zhang Yao, “‘Xindiguo lun’ pingxi” (On ‘New Empire’), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), No. 7 (2003), pp. 33-38; Ruan
Zongze, “‘Xindiguolun’ yu meiguo ‘zhenghe waijiao’” (The ‘New Empire’
and U.S. Policy of ‘Integration’), Meiguo yanjiu (American Studies), No. 3
(2002), pp. 36-49. dom have already raised alarm in the international community
and even strained the Atlantic alliance. 14 The Bush Doctrine: Chinese Analyses Chinese analyses of the Bush Doctrine place it within several broader contexts: the rise of neoconservatism that now domi-
nates U.S. foreign policy, in particular since the Bush administra-
tion came into office; the long-term American strategic objective
of sustaining its primacy even to the extent of empire building;
and the immediate needs and contingencies of combating global
terrorism. In their view, the doctrine reinforces the overall post-
cold war objective of sustaining U.S. dominance in international
affairs. The “new world order” of the previous Bush administra-
tion, introduced right after the close of the first Gulf War and
incorporating NATO expansion, promotion of marketization and
democratization, and conditional engagement of emerging
regional powers, was also designed to help achieve that objec-
tive. The September 11 terrorist attacks disrupted that process
and necessitated a change of tactics in dealing with the new secu-
rity threats. The Bush administration seized the opportunity pro-
vided by the tragic events to fight international terrorism, but
also to legitimize the preemptive use of force and extend its mili-
tary presence. The doctrine focuses on a number of elements
including: an emphasis on counter-proliferation and military
preemption to deal with rogue states and non-state terrorist
groups and the imminent threats they pose to U.S. interests;
homeland security and missile defenses; the establishment of a
new world order via an integration strategy; an elevated role for
nuclear weapons and a lowering of the nuclear threshold; regime
change; and great-power cooperation. 15 118 Jing-dong Yuan 14. Ivo H. Daalder, “The End of Atlanticism,” Survival, vol. 45, No. 2 (Sum- mer, 2003), pp. 147-66. 15. Zhongguo xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiusuo (China Institute of Contem- porary International Relations), Guoji zhanlüe yu anquan xingshi pinggu:
2002/2003 (Assessment of International Strategic and Security Situations:
2002/2003) (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe [Current Affairs Publishers], 2003),
pp. 18-41; Fu Mengzi, “‘Yichao’ xunmeng: meiguo weilai dazhanlüe”
(‘The Sole Superpower’ Pursuing Its Dreams: America’s Future Grand While most Chinese analysts strongly criticize U.S. unilater- alism, hegemonism, and preemptive use of force, some point out
that such behavior is also—and perhaps mainly—driven by the
requirements of anti-terrorism and is not aimed at China. The
United States in this view has not given up its traditional strate-
gies of containment and deterrence, and preemption is not
aimed at other major powers. Indeed, some of the concerns that
drive U.S. policy—such as the Korean nuclear issue and the
roots of international terrorism—are also shared by China. In
other words, there is a need to differentiate between proposed
strategies and actual policy practices. 25 In addition, unilateral- ism and preemption may encounter both domestic and interna-
tional criticism and the fact that Washington needs cooperation
with other major powers would seem certain to modify the
extent of the execution of the Bush Doctrine. 26 The Bush Doctrine: Implications for China Arms Issues Chinese reaction to the Bush Doctrine is by and large nega- tive. However, with regard to the exact targets of the doctrine
and how it affects China’s security interests, there are different
views. To some extent, the latter is also predicated on the state
of Sino-U.S. relations and their respective foreign-policy agen-
das at a particular moment. A much improved bilateral relation-
ship since 9-11 provides some cushion against the immediate
impact of the Bush Doctrine on China. 27 For the longer term, The Bush Doctrine 121 Embarks on a Strategy of ‘Preemption’), Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily),
June 28, 2002, p. 22. 25. Yang Jiemian, “Meiguo guojia anquan zhanlüe”; Wang Yiwei, “Zai tuoxie yu jinqu zhijian” (Between Compromises and Advances), Zhongguo
pinglun (China Review), August 2003, pp. 16-18. 26. Su Ge, “Lun meiguo guojia anquan zhanlüe de tiaozheng” (On Adjust- ments in U.S. National Security Strategy), Guoji wenti yanjiu (Interna-
tional Studies), No. 2 (2003), pp. 5-10, 22. 27. Jia Qingguo, “The Impact of 9-11 on Sino-US Relations: A Preliminary Assessment,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 3, No. 2
(August, 2003), pp. 159-77. tion in military affairs (RMA). 19 The adjustment further high- lights the importance of the Asia-Pacific region. 20 People’s Liber- ation Army military analysts point out that the relocation of U.S.
military focus to Asia clearly has China as the target. The end of
the cold war has left the United States with no comparable rival
and hence China’s position has risen. 21 The short-term goals of the United States would be to focus on anti-terrorism and home-
land security, including the use of preemption when necessary.
A medium-term objective is to seek adjustments in major-power
relations. However, for the long term, the goal is to maintain
U.S. dominance and promote U.S. values. 22 Preemption is considered part of an overhaul of post-cold war U.S. military strategies in the light of the new challenges it
faces. Under such circumstances, the cold-war strategy of deter-
rence may no longer be seen as workable against non-state actors
or so-called rogue states; it is natural then that preemption as a
military strategy should now be introduced and adopted. The
overall approach is a blend of defensive and offensive, conven-
tional and non-conventional, and capability-based defense pos-
ture. 23 Three groups of targets stand out prominently: transna- tional terrorist groups; (rogue) states seeking WMD and long-
range ballistic missile capabilities; and states harboring terrorist
groups/organizations/activities. 24 120 Jing-dong Yuan 19. Jin Canrong, “Meiguo: daodi nengzou duoyuan?” (The U.S.: How Far Can It Go), Shijie zhishi (World Affairs), No. 11 (2003), pp. 34-36. 20. “Forum: Meiguo quanqiu junli chongxin bushu” (U.S. Global Military Re-Deployment), Shijie zhishi (World Affairs), No. 14 (2003), pp. 20-28. 21. Han Xudong and Wei Konghu, “Tuoshi meiguo junshi zhanlüe datiaozheng” (An Analysis of Major Adjustments in U.S. Military
Strategies), Liaowang (Outlook Weekly), May 1, 2001, pp. 58-59; Wu
Qingli, “Meiguo yatai zhanlüe maotou zhixiangshui?” (To Whom Is
U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy Aimed?), Liaowang, pp. 60-61. 22. Yang Jiemian, “Meiguo de quanqiu zhanlüe he zhongguo de zhanlüe jiyuqi” (U.S. Global Strategy and China’s Strategic Opportunity), Guoji
wenti yanjiu (International Studies), March 2003, pp. 11-16. 23 Li Jingzhi, “Quebao bentu anquan, jiasu zhanlüe tiaozheng” (Ensure Homeland Security, Speed Up Strategic Adjustments), Dangdai shijie
(Contemporary World), December 2002, pp. 4-5; Su Bei, “Bushi weihe
na junshizhanlüe kaidao?” (Why Does Bush Undertake Surgery on Mil-
itary Strategy?), Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), June 24, 2002. 24. Shen Dingli, “Meiguo zouxiang ‘xian fazhiren’ zhanlüe” (The U.S. unconventional offensive systems, active and passive defenses,
and defense industrial infrastructure, aimed at preserving U.S.
military dominance and absolute security. Indeed, the U.S.
would retain massive retaliatory capabilities against other
nuclear powers even after significant cuts in its nuclear arsenals.
At the same time, it will also strive for continued conventional
superiority and support the research and development of low-
yield “mini-nukes” that would enable it to confront and neutral-
ize threats from the so-called “rogue” states in addition to main-
taining credible deterrence against other powers. 30 With this context, U.S. ballistic missile defenses become even more relevant for Chinese strategic thinking. The bottom
line is how U.S. missile defense systems will affect China’s core
national security interests, in particular the extent to which U.S.
defense posture could undermine the credibility and effective-
ness of China’s small-size nuclear retaliatory capabilities. How
would this affect the outcome of a showdown over Taiwan? Bei-
jing’s concerns are obvious. Since the PRC has only thirty or so
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), U.S. missile defense
systems, once deployed, could remove China’s limited second-
strike capabilities. One prominent Chinese missile defense ana-
lyst suggests that “China fears that if the USA believes that a
first nuclear strike plus a NMD [national missile defense] system
could render impotent China’s nuclear retaliatory capability, the
USA might become less cautious during any crisis involving
China.” 31 That crisis, in most instances, would be over Taiwan. Chinese officials and analysts are also concerned about the negative impact that U.S. missile defenses would have on the The Bush Doctrine 123 30. See Zhou Jianshe, “Meiguo xin anquan zhanlüe”; Zhu Qiangguo, “Meiguo heweishe zhanlüe de tiaozheng—hetaishi shenyi baogao
pingxi” (Readjustment of U.S. Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence—An
Analysis of the Nuclear Posture Review), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contem-
porary International Relations), No. 148 (February, 2002), pp. 28-31; Zhu
Qiangguo, “US Seeks Absolute Military Superiority,” China Daily, March
13, 2002; Zhou Jianguo, “Nuclear Strategy of Bush Administration Mov-
ing Gradually From Deterrence to Actual Combat,” Jiefangjun bao (PLA
Daily), March 18, 2002. 31. Li Bin, “The Effects of NMD on Chinese Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 7, 2001, online at www.janes.com/security/international_
security/news/jir/jir010307_1_n.shtml. though, two issues are of relevance. One is the impact of a pro-
longed U.S. unipolarity and military dominance not only on the
international system, but also on international organizations in
which China can potentially play a critical role, and on major-
power relations. The other is the sustainability of the Bush Doc-
trine. The latest developments in Iraq, at the United Nations,
and within the U.S. domestic context, all point to growing diffi-
culties in the Bush administration’s pursuit of unilateralism and
its threatened use of preemption. Nonetheless, there are serious implications for China in the Bush Doctrine. U.S. nuclear policy and missile defenses could
touch off an arms race and directly threaten Chinese security
interests. Washington’s policy toward the so-called “axis of evil”
states creates instability on China’s periphery. U.S. unilateralism
undermines the prospects for international cooperation, and con-
tinued U.S. dominance is an impediment to the establishment of
a multipolar world in which China could play an important role. U.S. nuclear policy is of considerable concern to China. The 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), a portion of which was
leaked to the media, contains contingency plans to use nuclear
weapons against seven countries, including Russia and China. 28 Chinese strategic analysts focus particularly on what they con-
sider as fundamental shifts in the post-cold war U.S. strategic
posture. One is the nuclear threshold. In the past, nuclear
weapons were always the weapon of last resort, for deterrence
against another state’s use of nuclear weapons. However, the
new posture suggests the use of nuclear weapons against hard-
ened, difficult-to-penetrate targets, and as retaliation against
WMD use by others. Perhaps the most serious concern to Beijing
is the potential nuclear use “in the event of surprising military
developments,” including a war between China and Taiwan. 29 The NPR calls for a new strategic triad of conventional and 122 Jing-dong Yuan 28. Paul Richter, “U.S. Works Up Plan for Using Nuclear Arms,” Los Ange- les Times, online ed., March 9, 2002; William M. Arkin, “Secret Plan Out-
lines the Unthinkable,” Los Angeles Times, online ed., March 10, 2002. 29. Zhu Feng, “Meiguo zhunbei fadong hegongji?” (Is the U.S. Prepared to Launch a Nuclear Attack?), Zhongguo ribao wangzhan, March 11, 2002,
online at www1.chinadaily.com.cn/worldrep/2002-03-11/20220.html;
interviews with Chinese security analysts, March 2002, Beijing and
Shanghai. good examples. On the Iraqi case, while supporting the return of
United Nations weapons inspections without preconditions,
China has all along advocated a political settlement of the issue
rather than a military solution. Chinese officials emphasize that
the Iraqi issue must be resolved within the political framework
of the UN system, that Baghdad should comply with all UN res-
olutions on weapons inspections, and that Iraq’s sovereignty
must be respected. Beijing’s emphasis on respecting Iraq’s sovereignty even as it admonished Baghdad to comply with all relevant UN resolutions
reflects a deeply held principle. Beijing’s reservations about pro-
viding UN authorization to allow U.S. military actions against
Iraq is consistent with its opposition to the use of force to settle
international conflict and to interventions in other countries’
domestic affairs. Indeed, China has been derided as the “vicar” of
state sovereignty at a time when the traditional notion of sover-
eignty is being challenged and eroded as a result of growing
international concerns over human rights abuses and the
inevitable demands for “rights beyond borders.” For China, one
of the key elements in the new international order should be a
continued emphasis on state sovereignty and noninterference in
domestic affairs. According to one Chinese scholar: “The princi-
ple of state sovereignty is a fundamental one in international law.
Sovereignty is one of the vital factors for the existence of states
and an indispensable feature of the subject of international law.
Any theory claiming sovereignty to be outdated is groundless.” 36 China worries about the potential for the United States to use the pretext of humanitarian intervention to challenge its sov-
ereignty over minority regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. US-
NATO intervention in Kosovo sent a chilling warning to policy
makers in Beijing that the United Nations could be bypassed and
that sovereignty could be ignored and violated. The Bush admin-
istration’s rhetoric about treating terrorist groups and the states
that harbor them alike only heightens China’s anxiety. The U.S. The Bush Doctrine 125 36. Wang Jiafu, “International Law and a New International Order,” paper presented at the Beijing Symposium on a New International Order, Bei-
jing, September 2-4, 1991, p. 3; quoted in David Armstrong, “Chinese
Perspectives on the New World Order,” Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol.
8, No. 2 (Summer-Fall, 1994), p. 471. international security environment and progress in arms control
and nonproliferation. 32 The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has the potential to undermine the global strategic bal-
ance. The ABM Treaty maintained a rough balance between U.S.
and Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear forces, reducing the incen-
tives for any preemptive first strike and therefore sustaining sta-
bility. 33 For this reason, Hu Xiaodi, the Chinese ambassador for disarmament, argued that the ABM Treaty’s “significance is far
beyond the scope of the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship and
has a direct bearing on the security of all countries.” 34 U.S. mis- sile defenses could touch off a new round of arms race in outer
space. A January 2001 report by the Commission to Assess Unit-
ed States National Security Space Management and Organization
calls for greater investments in science and technology resources
to maintain America’s superior space capabilities, which could
lead to the development, testing, and deployment of anti-satellite
weapons (ASAT) based in space or on earth. 35 Lessons from Iraq and North Korea U.S. policy toward the so-called “rogue states” raises at least three concrete issues for China. One is the challenge to state sov-
ereignty. The second is the potentially destabilizing effect such a
policy could cause, in turn threatening Chinese security inter-
ests. The third is the erosion of international organizations such
as the United Nations. The Iraqi and North Korean cases offer 124 Jing-dong Yuan 32. “PRC: Transcript of Sha Zukang’s Briefing on Missile Defense on 14 Mar.” FBIS-CPP 20010323000025; “Zhongguo fandui meiguo gao guojia
daodan fangyu xitong” (China Opposes US Development of National
Missile Defense Systems), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), overseas ed.,
March 15, 2001, p. 2; author interview with Chinese official, March
2002. 33. Deng Hao, “Fandao tiaoyue qianjing shenyou” (Dire Prospects for the ABM Treaty), Renmin ribao wangluoban (People’s Daily Online), July 7,
2000. 34. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China at the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament,”
February 15, 2001, Geneva. 35. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Operation. Executive Summary (January 11, 2001). destruction but would also bring down the North Korean
regime, depriving China of a strategically important buffer. The
environmental devastation would be severe and there would be
a massive refugee flight into China, where already an estimated
100,000 to 300,000 North Koreans are illegal residents. 38 A hasti- ly unified Korea following the collapse of the North Korean
regime would present Beijing with tremendous uncertainty.
China could face the prospect of a U.S. military presence right
up to the Chinese-Korean border. A united Korea might inherit
the North’s nuclear and missile capabilities and rising Korean
nationalism could also pose a challenge to Beijing’s ability to
manage its Korean ethnic minority in Jilin Province. Finally,
there is also the specter of a nuclear chain reaction, with con-
cerns over Japan’s possible rearmament and nuclearization,
using the North Korean nuclear issue as a pretext. 39 These considerations have led China to adopt a more active diplomacy in order to forestall the potentially negative conse-
quences. Indeed, one could argue that Beijing’s efforts played no
small part in getting Pyongyang to the April 2003 trilateral
meeting in Beijing and in their agreeing to accept the subsequent
six-party talks in late August. 40 However, while the process for engaging North Korea has been kept alive and both China and
the United States have found common ground for continued
cooperation and consultation, significant differences remain
between the two countries over specific approaches and long-
term objectives. These differences could in future strain bilateral
relations. 41 The Bush Doctrine 127 38. “North Korean Refugees in China: The Current Situation and Strategies for Protection,” testimony by Joel R. Charny, Vice President for Policy,
Refugees International to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
November 4, 2003, at foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/CharnyTesti-
mony031104.pdf. 39. Wang Yong and Teng Hongwei, “Jingti dongya xinlengzhan” (Beware of a New Cold War in East Asia). 40. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Beijing’s New Urgency over N Korea,” CNN.com, July 30, 2003; Jing-dong Yuan, “A Turning Point for Beijing,” Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, September 2, 2002, p. 6, online at www.iht.com/
articles/108434.html. 41. Phillip C. Saunders, “U.S.-China Relations in a Changing Nuclear Envi- ronment,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Sino-American Strategic Dynamics military operations that toppled Saddam Hussein—actions clear-
ly beyond the existing UN mandates on inspections—have only
heightened China’s concerns. The crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program also demonstrates the extent to which U.S. policy toward
Pyongyang could affect Beijing’s interests. China from the
beginning of the crisis stated its positions on the issue: first,
peace and stability on the Korean peninsula should be pre-
served; second, the peninsula should remain nuclear-free; and
third, the dispute should be resolved through diplomatic and
political methods. These positions form the core of Chinese
approaches to the resolution of the nuclear issue. Chinese offi-
cials and analysts maintained that the key to resolving the crisis
would be direct dialogue between North Korea and the United
States. Instead of blaming North Korea for the collapse of the
1994 Agreed Framework, Beijing called for both Pyongyang and
Washington to return to the agreement and resolve their dispute
through dialogue. The Chinese hoped that face-saving ways
could be found for Pyongyang and Washington to return to the
negotiating table. 37 Certainly China is wary of North Korea’s reckless behavior and does not want the nuclear crisis to get out of control. At the
same time, Beijing believes that Pyongyang’s nuclear gamble
stems from its acute sense of insecurity and vulnerability and
hence any resolution must address this issue. In this context,
continued support for North Korea is no longer driven by the
need to prop up an ideological bedfellow, but rather by China’s
long-term strategic interests. China will therefore oppose any
measures likely to precipitate the collapse of the North. Beijing worries that hard-line positions maintained by Pyongyang and Washington and a continued stalemate could
push North Korea to take even riskier steps. A military con-
frontation on the Korean peninsula not only would cause much 126 Jing-dong Yuan 37. Bates Gill and Andrew Thompson, “A Test for Beijing: China and the North Korean Nuclear Quandary,” Arms Control Today, vol. 33, No. 4
(May, 2003), online at www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/gillthomp-
son_may03.asp; Jing-dong Yuan, “China and the North Korean Nuclear
Crisis,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 22, 2003, at
cns.miis.edu/research/korea/chidprk.htm>. taking advantage of the global anti-terrorism campaigns, has been
pressing its set strategy of expanding influence and military pres-
ence in key regions of the world as part of its global strategy of
continuing its dominance and hegemony. 43 Indeed, China is wor- ried about the likely expansion of a U.S. military presence closer
to China’s doorstep. One legacy of the first Gulf War of 1990-1991
is an enlarged permanent U.S. military presence in the Persian
Gulf and Saudi Arabia. A U.S. military presence along China’s
periphery could exert further pressure on China. 44 Military opera- tions against Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan have already
brought U.S. armed forces to South and Central Asia, with which
China shares over 3,000 kilometers of border. China also faces
immediate worries about possible backlash and increasing num-
bers of refugees as a result of U.S. military retaliation. High-rank-
ing Chinese officials also warn that military retaliation could lead
to an escalation of revenge begetting revenge, further aggravating
terrorism and violence. The Bush administration’s rhetoric about
the “axis of evil” and the veiled threat to use military means to
deal with such regimes only heighten China’s anxiety. China thus faces a serious dilemma in crafting its response to the U.S. war on terrorism. On the one hand, it wants to be
seen as resolute and unfailing in its political support for action
against terrorism. On the other, it does not want to be closely
associated with U.S. military actions that violate state sovereign-
ty and invite retaliation. Beijing wants to join international
efforts in the fight against terrorism because international sup-
port may help it confront growing terrorist activities in support
of separatist movements in Xinjiang. At the same time, China is
concerned that prolonged U.S. military operations may set
precedents for future interference in domestic affairs and the
further erosion of the UN’s authority. 45 China wants to seize the opportunity to improve Sino-U.S. relations, but also wants to
exploit the opportunity to extract U.S. concessions on Taiwan, The Bush Doctrine 129 43. Liu Jianfei, “Terrorism and Hegemonism Harm World,” China Daily, March 15, 2003. 44. Liu Jianfei, “Gouzhu chengshu de zhongmei guanxi” (Developing a Mature Sino-U.S. Relationship), Liaowang (Outlook Weekly), June 2,
2003, pp. 10-11. 45. Denny Roy, “China and the War on Terrorism,” Orbis, vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer, 2002), pp. 511-21. International Norms and Institutions A third potential consequence of the Bush Doctrine and its unilateral foreign policy is the erosion of international norms and
institutions, which affects China’s normative interests in devel-
oping a new international order and multipolarity, and strength-
ening the role of international organizations such as the United
Nations. This has clearly been reflected in Chinese ambivalence
regarding the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaigns. While support-
ing the general goals of combating international terrorism, Bei-
jing has strong reservations about the use of military force.
Indeed, prior to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Beijing
had laid down several conditions to be met before it would
endorse U.S. military operations, namely, that actions should be
based on “concrete evidence,” should strictly observe interna-
tional law, should not hurt innocent civilians, and should be car-
ried out with authorization from the UN Security Council. 42 Underlying this ambivalence are Chinese perspectives on the post-cold war international order and their views on the
sources of international terrorism. Chinese perspectives on the
post-cold war world revolve around consistent themes of multi-
polarity, a greater UN role in world affairs, state sovereignty,
and noninterference in domestic affairs. China wants to be con-
sulted on important international issues and believes key securi-
ty issues should be handled through the UN Security Council,
where Beijing wields veto power as a permanent member. Given
China’s relatively weak but rising international position, it is
natural that it should have repeatedly emphasized the impor-
tance of the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty,
and noninterference in internal affairs. Chinese officials and
scholars suggest that these principles must form the basis of any
new international order. Finally, the Bush Doctrine, and its application in the name of anti-terrorism, have serious implications for long-term Chinese
security interests. Chinese analysts suggest that the United States, 128 Jing-dong Yuan in the Early 21st Century: Prospects, Scenarios, and Implications (Newport:
Naval War College Press, 2003), forthcoming. 42. John Pomfret, “China Offers Help—With Conditions,” Washington Post, September 18, 2001. its power projection capabilities, and, most importantly, by a pre-
dominantly Western international system. This being the case,
then, Beijing’s national interests must remain modest but stead-
fast on certain critical issues. 50 The end of the cold war, the transformation of Eastern Europe, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have affected
China’s security environment and threat perceptions in impor-
tant ways. On the one hand, Sino-Soviet normalization and the
continuing improvement of the Sino-Russian relationship have
removed a major source of threat to China’s security; on the
other hand, precisely because of the demise of the Soviet Union,
the ability of China to exploit its position in the strategic triangle
has been greatly reduced. During the cold war, China compen-
sated for its weakness through its alignment and realignment
with either of the two superpowers. Chinese foreign policy con-
centrated on securing a favorable position within the constraints
of superpower competition. With the end of the cold war, China
finds itself increasingly on the receiving end within the emerg-
ing international strategic environment. 51 The difficulties China faced during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 and afterwards are a clear
manifestation of the kind of constraints it now must encounter
in formulating and implementing foreign policy at both the
global and regional levels. 52 Beijing increasingly views post-cold war uncertainties and security threats as multifaceted, less well-
defined, and coming from a number of sources. 53 Obviously, China is faced not only with opportunities that a The Bush Doctrine 131 50. Chu Shulong, “Quanmian jianshe xiaokang shiqi de zhongguo waijiao zhanlüe” (China’s Diplomatic Strategy for the Period of Building a
Well-Off Society in an All-Round Way), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World
Economics and Politics), No. 8 (August, 2003), pp. 8-13. 51. William T. Tow, “China and the International Strategic System,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy:
Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 115-57. 52. Yitzhak Shichor, “China and the Gulf Crisis: Escape from Predica- ments,” Problems of Communism, vol. 40, No. 6 (November-December,
1991), pp. 80-90. 53. Wang Jisi, “Comparing Chinese and American Conceptions of Security,” NPCSD Working Paper, No. 17 (Toronto: North Pacific Cooperative
Security Dialogue Research Programme, York University, September
1992), p.16. missile defense, and its policy toward Xinjiang and Tibetan sep-
aratists. 46 These long-term normative and practical concerns are pitted against the more immediate challenges of crafting the
right policy in a volatile situation. Confronting the Hegemon: Chinese Options Chinese Pragmatism Clearly, the Bush Doctrine undermines China’s broader security interests. How Beijing reacts depends on its interests and
objectives, challenges, resources, and the options available. How-
ever, defining Chinese national interests in an evolving interna-
tional system have proved no easy task. The first issue to be
addressed is the question of China’s exact position: Is it to be a
great power of global reach, or a regional but predominant
power, or merely an emerging power with acute regional inter-
ests but one that has to share the center stage with other regional,
and even extra-regional, contenders? 47 Obviously, a superpower would have different national interests from one with merely
regional ambitions. However, the law of uneven development
would also suggest that a country’s national interests are never
static but are changing against the backdrops of the external
environment, one’s capabilities, technology, and self-evalua-
tion. 48 China stands between being an emerging regional power and one that increasingly sees itself as the natural leader in East
Asia, broadly defined. 49 But China’s aspirations are obviously constrained, by its own relatively low economic base despite
phenomenal growth over the past two decades, the limitation of 130 Jing-dong Yuan 46. Associated Press, “China Hints Its Muslim Separatists Fair Targets in War on Terror,” October 10, 2001. 47. Yu Xilai and Wu Zichen, “Shijie xinchixu yu xinxing daguo de lishi jueze” (The New World Order and the Historical Choice of Rising Powers),
Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 2 (1998), pp. 1-13. 48. Yan Xuetong, “Guojia liyi de panduan” (How to Evaluate National Interests), Zhanlüe yu guanli, No. 3 (1996), pp. 35-44. 49. Xin Qi, “‘Zhongguoquan’—yige lilun yu xianshi de chuxing” (The ‘China Circle’—An Underdeveloped Theory versus Reality), Zhanlüe yu
guanli, No. 3 (1996), pp. 1-7. It is a reality that countries in the world differ in size. The proposi-
tion that all countries, large or small, enjoy sovereign equality and
have the right to participate in the settlement of international
issues through consultation does not negate the important role big
countries play in international affairs. Big countries assume special
responsibilities in world affairs. 57 Indeed, Chinese analysts have viewed the emerging international
political order as composed of three pillars: the first represents
the five powers (the United States, Russia, the European Union,
Japan, and China); the second is the relationships between them;
and third is the role of the United Nations. 58 The developments in the late 1990s and China’s attempts to forestall U.S. missile
defenses also suggest a more realistic foreign-policy stance and
the prioritization of diplomacy and use of limited resources. 59 Managing Relations with the United States, and the Taiwan
Question Without question, managing its relationship with Washing- ton has always been the highest priority for Beijing. That rela-
tionship also affects a number of issues important for China, in
particular Taiwan. 60 Chinese scholars have identified a number of characteristics that define post-cold war Sino-U.S. relations. 61 The Bush Doctrine 133 57. Wan Guang, “Challenges Facing the World Today and the Establish- ment of the New International Order,” paper presented at the Beijing
Symposium on a New International Order, Beijing, September 2-4,
1991, p. 7; quoted in David Armstrong, “Chinese Perspectives on the
New World Order,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 8, No. 2 (Sum-
mer-Fall, 1994), pp. 471-72. 58. Hao Runchang, “Shijie zhengzhi xinggeju de chuxing jiqi qianjing” (The Emerging Structure of New World Political Structure and Its
Prospect), Heping yu fazhan (Peace and Development), No. 59 (March,
1997), pp. 1-4. 59. Jing-dong Yuan, “Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses: Implica- tions for Arms Control and Regional Security,” The Nonproliferation
Review, vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 2003), pp. 75-96. 60. Tang Zhengduan, Zhongmei qijuzhongde “Taiwan wenti” (The Taiwan Issue on the Sino-U.S. Chessboard) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe,
2000). 61. The following discussion is based on author’s interview, Institute of American Studies, China Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, August 25, post-cold war environment presents, but also the challenges,
some of which will determine the extent to which the opportuni-
ties can be exploited. Interestingly, with the exception of a brief
period of post-Tiananmen rhetoric of self-strengthening in the
aftermath of Western sanctions, the Chinese leadership endorses
the China-in-an-interdependent-world line, even if the interna-
tional political and economic orders are hardly of Beijing’s
choice. However, challenging the existing system seems out of
the question. 54 The lessons drawn from the past five hundred years of struggle for hegemony seem to suggest that challengers
have invariably failed; the successful leaders almost without
exception have tended to be the partners of their contemporary
hegemons. Obviously, given China’s current position, a strategy
of challenging is doomed to failure; even the perception by oth-
ers of China as a challenger does more harm than good to its
interests, since that would provide the pretext for current domi-
nating power(s) to turn to containment. 55 This probably explains why China’s foreign-policy approaches remain pragmatic even as it continues to advocate and promote
the principles of equality and justice in international affairs and
in the construction of a new international order. This goes back
to earlier Chinese debates on the post-cold war international
geostrategic environment and a more realistic assessment of
China’s own position and the constraints on what it might do.
Chinese experts recognized that great powers remain an impor-
tant factor and contend that any international order is based on the
existing structure of international power distribution and serves its
purposes. 56 One Chinese analyst argued: 132 Jing-dong Yuan 54. Yan Xuetong, “Zhongguo jueqi de keneng xuanzi” (The Rise of China and Its Choice of Strategies), Zhanlüe yu guanli, No. 6 (1995), pp. 11-14. 55. Shi Yinhong, “Guoji zhengzhi de shijixing guilu jiqidui zhongguo de qishi” (The Law of Centurial Significance in International Relations and
Its Relevance for China), Zhanlüe yu guanli, No. 5 (1995), pp. 1-2. See
also Wang Zaibang, “Shijie lingdaozhe diwei jiaoti de lishi fansi”
(Looking into the History of Power Changes in World Leadership),
Zhanlüe yu guanli, No. 6 (1995), pp. 1-5. 56. Yu Sui, “Shijie geju yu daguo guanxi ruogan wenti tantao” (Exploration of Some Issues on the World Configuration and Big-Power Relations),
Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), No. 2 (Feb-
ruary, 1998), pp. 38-44. which Chinese policy makers must heed domestic sentiment in
making foreign-policy decisions. 64 Fourth, there is an imbalance between developments in political and economic relationships. While the post-Tiananmen
Sino-U.S. political relationship has remained tenuous and less
stable due to the reasons discussed above, the bilateral economic
ties and interdependence have grown significantly over the
same period. In a way, such close economic ties have prevented
the occasionally strained bilateral relationship from deteriorat-
ing into one of open hostility and confrontation. However,
greater economic interdependence has yet to translate into a
more stable political relationship. Indeed, at times, it can exacer-
bate an already fragile political relationship. The pending trade
disputes over steel, textiles, and consumer electronics are illus-
trative of this mix. Finally, despite the changing international
politico-strategic environment, the management of bilateral con-
flicts remains important for the United States as China is crucial
in a number of areas (e.g., the role of the UN, WMD nonprolifer-
ation, South Asia, and the Korean peninsula) and Beijing’s coop-
eration is not a foregone conclusion. 65 Within such a context, the United States remains a major factor in Beijing’s threat perception and affects its formulation of
security policies. American forces in the Asia-Pacific are increas-
ingly seen as a major obstacle to China’s political and diplomatic
objectives in the region, in particular its drive for national unifi-
cation. The U.S. introduction of missile defense systems into the
region is also worrisome for China in two respects. It might
legitimize Japan’s re-militarization, and it could encourage inde-
pendence elements in Taiwan. For Beijing, the April 1996 U.S.-
Japan Joint Declaration on Security and the new U.S.-Japanese
Defense Cooperation Guidelines concluded in September 1997
were unwelcome developments in East Asia with negative The Bush Doctrine 135 64. Chinese analysts notice the rise of new conservatism in American poli- tics and its negative impact on U.S. China policy. See Ren and Shen,
Conservatism and U.S. Foreign Policy; Yuan Jian, “Xinbaoshoupai de wai-
jiao sixiang jiqi zai Meiguo de yingxiang” (The New Conservatives:
Their Ideas and Impact on American Foreign Policy), Guoji wenti yanjiu
(International Studies), No. 2 (April, 1998), pp. 19-28. 65. Chu Shulong, “Zhongmei hezuo yu fenqi” (Sino-US Relations: Cooper- ation and Divergence), Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 6 (June, 1998), pp. 2-6. First, with the end of the cold war, China’s weight in the previ-
ous strategic triangle has changed, and conflicting views and
interests previously concealed or relegated to second-place
importance are now assuming greater salience. These contrast-
ing views between Beijing and Washington include differences
on issues having to do with the post-cold war international
political and economic order, the role of the United Nations,
state sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and regional secu-
rity order. At the same time, disputes over trade, human rights,
and nonproliferation have increasingly become dominant issues
in bilateral relations. 62 Second, Sino-U.S. relations may be affected by their compet- ing interests in the Asia-Pacific region. At issue are the future
regional security architecture, with China promoting its new con-
cept of security cooperation and the United States continuing to
emphasize the importance of military alliances, missile defense,
and U.S.-Taiwan ties. Third, ideologies and domestic politics will
play a more prominent role in the two countries’ foreign-policy
decision making. 63 The U.S. debates on the rise of China between the so-called “Blue Team” (which views China’s emergence as a
great threat to American interests) and the “Red Team” (which
sees merit in China’s emergence and is confident that an engage-
ment strategy can effectively integrate China into the existing
international system) are a clear example. Likewise, the national-
ism aroused in the aftermath of the bombing of the Chinese
embassy and the EP-3 incident in 2001 also reflect the extent to 134 Jing-dong Yuan 1998; Chu Shulong, Lengzhan hou zhongmei guanxi de zuoxiang (Sino-U.S.
Relations in the Post-Cold War Era) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue
chubanshe, 2001); Liu Xuecheng and Li Jidong, eds., Zhongguo he meiguo:
duishou haishi huoban (China and the United States: Rivals or Partners?)
(Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 2000); Jin Canrong, “Lengzhanhou
zhongmei guanxi de jiben tedian yu kuangjia” (The Basic Characteristics
and Framework of Sino-US Relations Following the Cold War), Zhong-
guo Pinglun (China Review) No. 53 (May, 2002), pp. 14-18. 62. See Bates Gill, Contrasting Visions: United States, China, and World Order (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, forthcoming); David M.
Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations
1989-2000 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2001). 63. Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Rela- tions (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003). sive self-defense to a collective defense function, therefore pro-
viding justification for Japan to intervene in regional security
affairs. 69 And finally, the guidelines could be interpreted as extending the alliance’s defense perimeter to include the Taiwan
Strait. China is understandably concerned about the possible
intervention of the U.S.-Japan alliance in what it regards as its
internal affairs and reunification plans. Tokyo’s ambiguity
regarding its defense perimeter based not on geography but on
events only heightens Beijing’s anxiety. 70 Washington’s Taiwan policy is the most serious security concern for Beijing. Three trends are particularly disturbing for
the Chinese leadership. The first is U.S. deviation from the “One
China” principle set forth in the three Sino-U.S. joint commu-
niqués. In recent years, the United States has steadily upgraded
its supposedly unofficial ties with Taiwan. High-ranking Tai-
wanese officials have been granted visas to make transit stops
on their way to Central and South America. The second trend is
continuing U.S. military sales to Taiwan, which is seen by China
as contravening the spirit of the August 17, 1982 Sino-U.S. Com-
muniqué. 71 Over the last two decades since the communiqué was issued, the United States has provided Taiwan with a full
spectrum of military equipment, including F-16 air superiority
fighters, Knox-class frigates, Kidd-class destroyers, anti-subma-
rine S-2T, E-2T “Hawkeye” airborne early-warning aircraft,
long-range early-warning radars, attack helicopters, Patriot-
derived Modified Air Defense Systems, and “Hawk” and
“Chaparral” ground-based air defense systems, among others.
The U.S. Department of Defense also runs exchange programs
with Taiwan on C 4 I, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare The Bush Doctrine 137 69. Liang Ming, “Ri-Mei xin fangwei jihua yinren zhumu” (The New U.S.- Japan Defense Guidelines Attracts Attention), PLA Daily, online ed.,
December 22, 2000. 70. Liu Jiangyong, “Xin ‘Ri-Mei fangwei hezuo zhizhen’ heyi lingren youlü” (Why Do the New U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation Guidelines Arouse
Concern?), Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 11 (November, 1997), pp. 7-12. 71. Wei-Chin Lee, “US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: from Carter to Clinton,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 9, No. 23 (March, 2000), pp.
53-75; John P. McClaran, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: Implications for
the Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship,” Asian Survey, vol. 40, No. 4
(July-August, 2000), pp. 622-40. effects on Chinese security interests. The continued presence of
U.S. military forces in the region, and a resilient U.S.-Japan secu-
rity alliance at a time of much reduced security threats in the
region, only caused the Chinese to ponder on their true inten-
tions and implications for its own security. While in the past the
alliance in Beijing’s eyes served a useful purpose of keeping
Tokyo from seeking re-militarization, it is now increasingly
viewed as a security threat. 66 Three issues stand out. First, Beijing considers the revitalized U.S.-Japan military alliance to be part of Washington’s strategy of
containing China. After all, the U.S.-Japan alliance was estab-
lished during the cold-war years with a clearly defined enemy
and missions: namely the Soviet Union, and the defense of
Japanese territories. With the end of the cold war, the raison
d’etre (protecting Japan from Soviet attack) no longer holds, and
the rationale for its continued existence and even strengthening
are unmistakably clear: China is now targeted as a potential
adversary. Second, China is extremely worried about the consequences of a more assertive Japan actively involved in the region’s secu-
rity affairs and seeking to be a “normal” power. 67 The new defense guidelines have in effect shifted the alliance’s mission
from defending Japan to one in which Japan will be actively
involved in regional security activities. Japan already has one of
the largest defense budgets in the world and has a reasonably
sized military (given its peace constitution), which is neverthe-
less the best-equipped military in the region. In addition,
Japan’s industrial and technological wherewithal will provide it
with ready resources should it decide to become a military great
power at short notice, including the possible acquisition of
nuclear weapons. 68 The new defense cooperation guidelines in effect give Japan the green light to go beyond the original exclu- 136 Jing-dong Yuan 66. Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring,
1999), pp. 49-80. 67. Lu Zhongwei, “Riben de guojia zuoxiang yu Ri-Zhong guanxi” (Japan’s Course of Direction and Its Relationship With China), Xiandai guoji
guanxi (July, 2001), pp. 2-7. 68. “Opposition Leader Ozawa Says Japan Could Produce Nuclear Weapons,” Kyodo (English ed.), April 6, 2002. FBIS-JPP20020406000056. affects how Beijing assesses the impact of the Bush Doctrine on
its security interests. 76 The Bush administration has been critical of the Clinton approaches to U.S. China policy. There are at least
three areas of major policy differences. First, instead of viewing
China as a “strategic partner,” the Bush administration has char-
acterized its relationship with China as more complex, where
the two countries can cooperate on certain issues but are likely
to compete on others. During the presidential campaigns, candi-
date Bush on several occasions even referred to China as Ameri-
ca’s “strategic competitor.” 77 Second, the Bush administration has moved away from a Tai- wan policy anchored in “strategic ambiguity.” The Clinton
administration tilted toward a more explicit “One China” position
expressed in the “three no’s”—no to Taiwan independence; no to
one China, one Taiwan; and no support of Taiwan membership in
international organizations where statehood is required. However,
Bush administration officials have emphasized American obliga-
tions under the Taiwan Relations Act, a strong preference for
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and explicit opposition to
coercion and the use of force. Washington has made its commit-
ment to defend Taiwan from an attack by the mainland very
clear. In this regard, Bush’s controversial statement of “whatever
it takes” to help defend Taiwan has deeper philosophical under-
pinnings shared by a number of high-ranking Bush administra-
tion officials. 78 Indeed, the past few years have seen increasing interactions between high-level Taiwanese and U.S. officials,
including those between the two militaries. Transit stops granted
to Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette
Lu are also more frequent than during the Clinton administration.
Washington has also openly supported Taiwan’s bid to join the
World Health Organization. 79 The Bush Doctrine 139 76. Jing-dong Yuan, “Friend or Foe? The Bush Administration and U.S. China Policy in Transition,” East Asian Review, vol. 15, No. 3 (Autumn,
2003), pp. 39-64. 77. For a review of candidate Bush’s various policy positions regarding China, see the Council on Foreign Relations’ website “Campaign 2000:
the Candidates, Their Supporters & Experts Debate Foreign Policy,”
online at www.foreignpolicy2000.org/library/index.html. 78. Jane Perlez, “Bush Carries Some Baggage in Developing China Stance,” New York Times, August 29, 1999. (ASW). 72 Third and finally, there have been incessant congressional efforts not only to enhance the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, as is
manifest in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, but also to
expand it to include closer security cooperation. 73 The 1999 Tai- wan Security Enhancement Act, which was passed in the House
of Representatives in a landslide vote, would require even closer
defense cooperation between the United States and Taiwan in
the areas of defense planning, threat analysis, training pro-
grams, and missile defense systems, all of which have been
strongly opposed by Beijing. 74 The establishment of the Taiwan caucuses in the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives are
the latest development. In recent years, the United States has
steadily upgraded its supposedly unofficial ties with Taiwan.
China’s strong objections to missile defense coverage of Taiwan
therefore are based on the following three reasons: it would
encourage Taiwan independence; it would lead to a de facto Tai-
wan-U.S. security alliance; and it would interfere with China’s
unification objectives. According to Ambassador Sha Zukang,
“TMD in Taiwan will give the pro-independence forces in Tai-
wan a false sense of security, which may incite them to reckless
moves. This can only lead to instability across the Taiwan Strait
or even in the entire North-East Asian region.” 75 The Bush administration’s evolving China policy hence 138 Jing-dong Yuan 72. East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Arms Sales to Taiwan: Statements and Developments 1979-2003,”
online at www.nti.org/db/china/twnchr.htm. Additional information
regarding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan can also be found at taiwansecurity.
org/TSR-Arms.htm. 73. James Mann, “Congress and Taiwan: Understanding the Bond,” in Ramon H. Myers, Michel C. Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh, eds.,
Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administration
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), pp. 201-19. 74. Julian Baum, “Silent Running,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 1, 1999, p. 28; George Gedda, “China Warns Against Sales to Taiwan,”
Associate Press, October 14, 1999, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
5...ne/19991014/aponline163839_000.htm. 75. Amb. Sha Zukang, “Some Thoughts on Non-Proliferation,” statement to the Seventh Annual Carnegie International Nonproliferation Confer-
ence on Repairing the Regime, Washington, DC, January 11-12, 1999,
online at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/4061.html. affected will depend on U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy
in the coming years. 83 For the time being at least, common inter- ests in fighting global terrorism and defusing the North Korean
nuclear crisis have seen Beijing and Washington enjoy a period of
a stable relationship. However, Chinese analysts point out that
the new Chinese leadership faces serious challenges in the coming
years. Handling these challenges will require that China maintain
a stable working relationship with the United States to advance
China’s interests. Certainly Beijing should not seek confrontation
with Washington. To challenge U.S. unipolarity would only
reinforce the position of the “China threat” advocates in the U.S.
government. 84 As a result, China’s responses to U.S. dominance have remained low-key, and focus on key areas of fundamental
security interests such as Taiwan. At the same time, Beijing is
seeking opportunities to expand cooperation with the United
States to advance its short- to medium-term interests, which are
continued economic development and the strengthening of com-
prehensive national power. 85 Assuming that unipolarity will remain a fact of life in international politics for some time to come, the primary goals of
Chinese foreign policy will be to sustain a benign international
environment for the development and strengthening China’s
power. China will oppose hegemony but at the same time avoid
direct confrontation with the United States. Unilateralism and
preemption, while deplorable, are not directly targeted at China
and therefore confronting unipolar hegemonism should not be
China’s strategic priority. China’s security interests are better
served by seeking and developing a strategic dialogue with the
United States to reduce mistrust and better address China’s secu- The Bush Doctrine 141 zhongmei guanxi” (The Period of Strategic Opportunity and Sino-US
Ties), Liaowang, January 20, 2003, pp. 56-57; Yuan Peng, “9.11 shijian yu
zhongmei guanxi” (September 11th and Sino-U.S. Relations), Xiandai
guoji guanxi, No. 11 (November, 2001), pp. 19-23, 63. 83. Adam Ward, “China and America: Trouble Ahead?” Survival, vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 35-56. 84. Shi Yinhong, “Zhongguo de waibu kunnan he xinlingdao jiti miandui de tiaozhan” (China’s External Difficulties and Challenges Faced by the
New Leadership), Zhanlüe yu guanli, No. 3 (May, 2003), pp. 34-39. 85. Denny Roy, “China’s Reaction to American Predominance,” Survival, vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 57-78. Third, the Bush administration has adopted firmer tactics in dealing with China. The administration will seek Beijing’s coop-
eration where it can, but will also be firm in dealing with China
when necessary. Unlike the Clinton administration, the Bush
administration will not subordinate concerns over specific issues
to the broader goal of preserving the overall bilateral relation-
ship. A good example is in the nonproliferation area. Whereas
the Clinton administration sought to use the threat of sanctions
as leverage to change Chinese behavior, the Bush administration
has used sanctions to penalize Chinese companies and individu-
als for alleged nonproliferation violations. Indeed, the Clinton
administration imposed sanctions against China twice during
the entire eight years it was in office, but the Bush administra-
tion has already done so nine times. 80 The Bush administration is determined not to allow China to get away with what it con-
siders to be irresponsible behavior. The 9-11 terrorist attacks on the United States have been a turning point in Sino-U.S. relations. Changes in U.S. priorities fol-
lowing the terrorist attacks provided a “strategic window of
opportunity” for rebuilding a tattered bilateral relationship. 81 The Bush administration’s international focus is now on the war
against terrorism, not on the possibility of a future challenge from
China. Washington is seeking cooperation with major powers.
Chinese analysts recognize that the challenge for Beijing will be to
maximize the benefits and minimize other negative impacts, such
as the growing U.S. global military presence and a possible pre-
emptive use of force. 82 How China’s security interests will be 140 Jing-dong Yuan 79. See Robert Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy Toward Beijing and Taipei,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 12, No. 36 (August, 2003),
pp. 477-92. 80. On U.S. sanctions against China, see East Asia Nonproliferation Pro- gram, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Arms Control and Nonpro-
liferation Sanctions against China,” online at www.nti.org/db/china/
sanct.htm. 81. Jia, “The Impact of 9-11”; David M. Lampton, “Small Mercies: China and America after 9/11,” The National Interest (Winter 2001/2002), pp.
106-13. 82. Wang Jisi, “Xinxingshi de zhuyao tedian he Zhongguo waijiao” (Main Characteristics of the New Situation and China’s Diplomacy), Xiandai
guoji guanxi, No. 4 (April, 2003), pp. 1-3; Liu Jianfei, “Zhanlüe jiyuqi yu real concern that Washington’s approach to the so-called rogue
states may only worsen the situation, which in turn could have a
seriously negative impact on Chinese security interests. While Beijing has a very negative view of the Bush Doctrine, its responses have been more measured, low-key, and pragmatic
than some analysts have expected. China recognizes its own limi-
tations and the need to avoid direct confrontation with the Unit-
ed States. At the same time, there is also the recognition that the
application of the Bush Doctrine will be limited in scope and will
apply to only a few exceptional cases simply because such a pos-
ture cannot be sustained long in the face of domestic and interna-
tional opposition. Beijing seized the opportunity provided by 9-
11 and the changing focus of U.S. security policy to expand areas
of common interest while minimizing the impact of differences.
To a significant extent, how the Bush Doctrine will affect China’s
interests in future will depend on how well the two manage their
increasingly complex relationship. Principal References “Bush at Midterm.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, No. 5 (September- October 2003), pp. 1-44. Chu Shulong. Lengzhan hou zhongmei guanxi de zuoxiang (Sino- U.S. Relations in the Post-Cold war Era). Beijing: Zhong-
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ticipation in the U.S. Container Security Initiative, are guided by
such a recognition. 87 Conclusion The Bush Doctrine has generated much controversy since its inception and implementation in Iraq. While the underlying
rationale for adopting such a unilateralist and confrontational
approach is well documented, and indeed administration offi-
cials and supporters have gone out of their way in their assur-
ance that the doctrine supplements rather than replaces tradi-
tional approaches to security, its impact has been largely nega-
tive: It has alienated many members of the international com-
munity and deeply concerned others. Beijing faces a serious challenge. On the one hand, the Bush Doctrine clearly affects Chinese interests in potentially negative
ways. U.S. unilateralism erodes and undermines international
norms and institutions, and is contrary to the principles that
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ity, and a more prominent role for the United Nations through
which Beijing is expected to be consulted and through which it
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